Guest Series on Tribal Gaming (Part 6)

Today, our sixth installment of Jim Marino’s series of articles on tribal casino gaming in California (originally published in the Santa Ynez Valley Journal) looks at the corruption in California that followed the explosion of Indian casinos.  “Tribes” of one person . . . lobbying slush funds . . . it’s all there, proving that money, politics, gaming, and corruption are natural bedfellows.  Those who oppose the introduction of casino gaming to their communities are often wrongly characterized as puritans.  True, opposition to gambling may be a factor for some, but there’s so much more to the issue than just the issue of gambling.  As this article makes clear, no one should walk blindly into creating Indian gaming in their community without knowing more about the social impact of it–from crime rates to the powerful influence of gaming profits on local government.  It’s something to keep in mind as we consider the far reaching implications of the Akaka Bill.  (And recall that–even though the current version of the Bill does not allow for Native Hawaiian casinos, there was a time when such casinos weren’t permitted in California too.)

CORRUPTION OF CALIFORNIA’S GOVERNMENT
BY INDIAN GAMBLING DOLLARS
Santa Ynez Valley Journal
By Jim Marino, Guest Columnist
May 20, 2010

(Part 6)

In a 5-part series, I outlined what led up to the advent of the Indian Gaming and Regulatory Act of 1988. How Congress engaged in a feeble attempt to wean Indian tribes from total federal dependence and at the same time clarify the 1987 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Cabazon Tribe versus California. How Congress completely failed to take into account the complex and confusing body of Indian law, including the court-created doctrine of Indian tribal immunity from lawsuit.

Then I discussed the tortured history of how Indian gambling found its way into California illegally and the attempts to legalize it by corrupt politicians and Gov. Gray Davis, who executed 59 tribal-state compacts for casinos with several tiny bands of questionable Indian descent, and who had no legally eligible lands on which to build and operate a gambling casino and even allow questionable “tribes” to purchase land near perceived gambling markets in a practice that came to be known as “reservation shopping.”

These often ridiculous policies and events led to the rapid expansion of Indian gambling casinos all over California being thrust into many communities who didn’t want them and which provided no benefit despite the creation of “jobs.” That was because of the many negative impacts of such a casino and the demands placed on public services and infrastructure, which the Indian casinos and businesses used regularly while paying no taxes.

This continuing article is to demonstrate how pervasive the corruption from Indian gambling dollars has become. Although there are many examples, this limited space only allows for the recounting of some of the typical and more outrageous examples of it.

As set out in the earlier series, Gov. Davis owed his election to the massive contributions from Indian casinos operating illegally in California at the time and the massive campaign instituted by those tribes, many of which had only a handful of members, and fractional and often questionable claims to being “Indian” at all. A campaign to enact a tribal initiative to amend the California Government Code known as Proposition 5 was circulated in an attempt to legalize the illegal Indian gambling casinos operating in California at the time.

To repay this largesse, once elected, Gov. Davis negotiated 59 tribal-state compacts through the summer of 1999 with these illegal existing casino tribes and many other questionable groups, several with no eligible land upon which gambling would be allowed under federal law. These compacts had been negotiated behind closed doors under the authority of Proposition 5 enacted in November 1998 at the same time Davis was elected.

These secretive negotiations took place behind closed doors, away from all of the major public forces that usually shape laws, such as city and county governments, unions, law enforcement, women’s rights groups, environmental protection groups, local and consumer rights groups and lawyers’ organizations. Even though the California Supreme Court had struck down Proposition 5 in August 1999, undaunted, Gov. Davis executed these give-away “sweetheart” compacts in September 1999 and had the democratically controlled legislature approve them in October 1999. To overcome the fact there was no statutory authority to execute and approve those compacts after the August 1999 Supreme Court decision, Gov. Davis and the Legislature put a “legislative initiative” on the March 2000 ballot called Proposition 1A. Although this initiative amended the State Constitution to authorize the Governor to negotiate future tribal-state compacts, it was, in effect, an initiative designed to retroactively ratify the 59 compacts signed earlier without lawful authority and without informing the voters.

As if this corrupted set of events was not enough, it was but the opening bell in a bruising round of corrupt practices that followed at both the state and federal level.

Proposition 1A established two funds: The Revenue Sharing Trust Fund and the Special Distribution Fund. The former was a fund established by the state into which those tribes with casinos would pay money. That fund would then make annual payments to “Indian tribes” in California that did not have casinos, or had casinos with fewer than 300 slot machines. Each “tribe” would receive an annual distribution of $1,100,000 over and above the hundreds of thousands they receive in federal welfare and grant monies.

Some of these “tribes” had only one or two members, like the Valley Miwoks and the Buena Vista MeWuks and Mary Ann Martin’s Augustine Band of Cahuilla Mission Indians. She was the only member of that “tribe” and not only entitled to receive a $1.1 million dollar distribution but also hundreds of thousands of dollars each year in federal welfare and grant money for “tribal government,” “tribal economic development,” “tribal housing,” and so forth. Many other bands or tribes had perhaps a handful of members.

The first thing that happened once Indian gambling became openly legal was that these casino tribes began contributing monies large and small to various politicians at the state and local level.

Many of you may recall how Jack Abramoff, the now imprisoned and disgraced lobbyist, got $80 million from one “poor” Indian tribe in Alabama with orders to spread it around Washington politicians, in order to block another Indian tribe’s attempt to open a competing casino. When the scandal finally broke, the Indian tribal governments and liberal media castigated Abramoff and his partner Scanlon for his activities, but carefully concealed the fact it was the Indian tribal governments, lawyers and lobbyists that furnished the tribal ‘pay-off” monies and that Abramoff was just the bag man delivering the tribal gambling monies to the many corrupt politicians he knew and who willingly took it.

One tribal government operating a gambling casino near Palm Springs gave Abramoff $10 million and then later refused to disclose what it was for, even to the tribal membership. State Senator Jim Battin from Palm Springs received tens of thousands of dollars in Indian casino contributions deposited into committees mostly called “The Friends of Jim Battin.” These committees were very generous in handing out tens of thousands of those casino dollars to other Sacramento politicians, lending a new meaning to the expression “it pays to have friends.” When he finally got in trouble with the state F.P.P.C. and they filed complaints against him, he and these Indian casinos set up the “Jim Battin Defense Fund.”

Senator Battin, (now termed out), was a champion of Indian gambling causes of all kinds. A year or two ago, the former chairman of the Indian Gaming Commission, Phillip Hogen, had been trying to change the federal rules defining more clearly what a slot machine was. Casino Indians and slot machine manufacturers had designed machines they called Bingo machines. Bingo under the IGRA is a class II gambling game that can be operated by a tribe without needing a tribal-state compact. Such a tribal-state compact is required for class III casino gambling, including the use of slot machines.

The compact requirement is the only way states can require tribes to pay money for all of the public services and infrastructure they use at the taxpayers’ expense. The compacts are also the way states can impose rules and regulations on gambling tribes. Commissioner Hogen had been trying to change the rules for years and reclassify these “Bingo machines” as facsimile slot machines subject to state control and the tribal-state compact requirements.

Sen. Battin wrote a letter, at the time, to Commissioner Hogen urging him not to change the rule, and he had 20 other Senators sign it. So, here we have fully one-half of our state’s Senators opposing a federal rule change that would be a direct benefit to the State of California, the state that they are supposed to be representing.

As I wrote in an article last year for this Valley Journal titled “Pay to Play,” this Indian casino corruption is rampant. Locally the Chumash and other tribes pushed for a bill early on in the gambling casino saga. They urged adoption of a bill in the Legislature that required local communities to come hat in hand for monies from the special distribution fund that were paid into it by gambling tribes. This money was originally intended to mitigate the negative impacts of casinos on local communities. That bill established local committees, controlled by the very Indian tribes causing the negative impacts who would then either approve or disprove any requests for grants by local governments to be made from the monies that were originally in that fund to mitigate those impacts.

On another occasion when the IRS refused to allow Indian tribes to issue tax-free bonds for gambling casino construction, arguing that such bonds were for public works projects, the tribes went to their friends in Sacramento – and introduced a bill to have the State of California issue tax-free bonds on their behalf.

When the gambling tribes wanted to eliminate any competition, they went to Sacramento again and had a bill introduced to place a long moratorium on the issuance of any more private non-Indian card room licenses that is still in effect. In fact, they just got their buddies in the Legislature to extend it.

When they wanted to eliminate competition from charities conducting Bingo games for charitable purposes, they got their Legislative friends to pass a bill banning the use of these Bingo machines by charities. You remember, the same machines they argued to the federal government were not slot machines at all, but then when they wanted to block their use by charities in California, they claimed that the state should not allow this use because it infringed on their exclusive right to operate “slot machines,” as provided for in the tribal-state compacts and in Art. 4, section 19 of the State Constitution.

Even locally, you may recall, when the Chumash wanted to rename San Marcos Pass/Highway 154 “The Chumash Highway,” they went to another friend of the Indian casino tribes, Assemblyman Coto, who has taken thousand of dollars from casino tribes and is now doing so for a run for the State Senate. Assemblyman Coto represents a San Jose District some 300 miles from here.

After receiving a generous political contribution of several thousand dollars from the Chumash, he introduced a resolution to rename Highway 154 as the Chumash Highway.

This was done without any local notice or knowledge and/or a resolution from the Santa Barbara County Board of Supervisors, which resolution was required by a section of the California Streets and Highways Code. It was then shepherded quietly through the legislature by a number of elected officials in record time, many of whom had received thousands of dollars from the Chumash and tens of thousands from other casino tribes. The community only learned of the resolution when the tribe issued a press release after the fact.

In another recent episode of attempted corrupt influence, in order to further their ambitious acquisition and development plans, the Chumash gave State Sen. Florez a $15,000 “contribution,” and within a month or two he introduced a bill to relieve the Chumash (and ostensibly other Indian tribes) from complying with the limitations contained in the Williamson Preservation Act, apparently knowing they were going to purchase the 1,400-acre former Fess Parker property and other properties still restricted by Williamson Act limitations. Fortunately, that bill was soundly rejected by the Local Government Affairs Committee, with the chairman, State Sen. Cox stating, “You wouldn’t be here, Sen. Florez, if it wasn’t for the Chumash.”

This corruption from gambling dollars is bi-partisan. Two years ago, when four tribes wanted to expand the number of slot machines in their casinos, they not only spent well over $70 million promoting the amended compacts on the statewide ballot, they also gave the State Republican party $5 million. Not coincidentally, the Republican Party then spent about the same amount of money supporting those ballot propositions which were numbered 34-38 and ultimately were approved.

In addition, Indian casino tribes spent more than 35 million to oppose race track efforts to obtain slot machines at their tracks in propositions 93-95 on the ballot in that same election. Such slot machines would have competed with tribal casinos, having exclusive rights to have slot machines.

What is perhaps the most ironic, if not astounding aspect of all this corruption from these Indian gambling casinos and their political contributions, is the fact that these political pay-offs are not legal by federal law. Title 25 section 2710 of the I.G.R.A. provides as follows:

2710(2)(B) net revenues from any tribal gaming are not to be used for purposes other than –

(i) To fund tribal government operations or programs

(ii) To provide for the general welfare of the Indian tribe and its members

(iii) To promote tribal economic development

(iv) To donate to charitable organizations; or

(v) To help fund operation of local government agencies.

The obvious question is into which one of these categories could political contributions and pay-offs possibly fit? How, for example, could an Indian tribe justify putting money into a fund, like the Jim Battin Defense Fund, whose purpose is to defend a politician from state allegations of illegal acts and practices constituting violations of the Fair Political Practices laws?

When I put that very question to former Chairman of the NIGC Phillip Hogen, he could not answer it. That is most likely because such contributions do not fit into any one of these five categories of permissible uses.

That brings me to the last point and that is, where are the provisions to enforce the federal laws and state laws that should be regulating Indian gambling casinos but are not? I thought I could conclude this series in 5 installments but that has proven impossible.

So next time, the final installment: “Why no one enforces the laws intended to limit and regulate Indian gambling.”


Guest Series on Tribal Gaming (Part 5)

Today’s entry in our continuing series on Tribal Gaming in California by Jim Marino looks at the false economy of Indian casinos.  For the state, that is.  And any other residents who aren’t fortunate enough to have a profit stake in said casinos.  You know, this has always been one of my particular stumbling blocks.  After all, when one is dazzled by the glitter of Vegas or the sheer amount of cash changing hands in a casino, it’s hard to imagine that they can actually have a negative economic impact on the community.  But, as Marino explains (in this piece originally published in the Santa Ynez Valley Journal), there’s a lot more to the economy of tribal gaming than meets the eye . . .

THE FALSE ECONOMICS OF INDIAN GAMBLING CASINOS
AND ITS CORRUPTION OF THE STATE’S GOVERNMENT

Santa Ynez Valley Journal
By Jim Marino, Guest Columnist
May 13, 2010

(Part 5)

Last week I wrote about the many negative impacts Indian casinos imposed on the host communities. I wrote about the underhanded way the 59 tribal compacts were negotiated secretly and executed and then the clandestine ratification of them by the passage of the “Legislative Initiative” called Proposition 1A, months after former Gov. Grey Davis signed them and the Legislature approved them illegally with no Constitutional authority to do so.

I also wrote about the worthless content of these “sweetheart” compacts and how they provided no benefit to the state or local communities, except the massive political contributions these casino tribes now make regularly to the many politicians in the hip pocket of their gambling casino benefactors.

These casinos were thrust into communities under the claim the federal Indian Gambling Act [I.G.R.A.] and the state compacts made them a “done deal” and the local communities had nothing to say about it.

But if they didn’t oppose them, these local communities might get some of the gambling dollars in lieu of the many taxes local and state government could not collect. If the local government did not cooperate, on the other hand, they would get no money and often would be accused of being anti-Indian racists and insensitive to the plight of “Indians” in America. After wielding this political stick, these gambling investors and tribes would then wave the carrot, telling local government they would create “jobs” and thus be a great benefit to the community.

This week I’ll discuss the false nature of these claims and the negative economic impacts on every community that are easily identifiable and those that are more difficult to measure. Lastly, I will discuss the manner in which a literal handful of casino Indians and their gambling cartel have totally corrupted the State of California and its 38 million citizens.

One does not have to be an economist to understand the false economy of gambling casinos in general. The vast sums of money lost there in the name of entertainment are often monies lost by people who cannot afford to lose that money. Slot machines are the favorite vehicle to lose money, accounting for about 85 percent of the profits raked in by all casinos.

The difference between a casino in Nevada and an Indian casino is stark: The gambling casinos in Nevada pay taxes; Indian casinos do not. The Nevada casinos are strictly regulated and policed. Indian casinos are not. Nevada casinos require minimum fair rates of return for slot machines. Indian casinos do not and are free to change out the random operating chips in these slot machines whenever they want.

The tremendous costs of providing public services like police, fire, schools, jails, hospitals, public works, social services, etc., used regularly by Indian casinos and related businesses, and the demands placed on infrastructure like roads, bridges, public buildings, and other facilities, are all paid for by the non-Indian taxpayers because these tribal businesses are exempt from property taxes, bed taxes, sales taxes, personal property taxes, corporate taxes and state income taxes among others.

As an example, the Chumash casino grossing between $250 and $300 million a year in gambling losses, is able to evade approximately $20 million in combined taxes annually. The Chumash put sales tax as an item on bills and receipts and in an amount identical to what the state requires for all others, in order to make customers think the tribe pays the state tax monies. But that money does not go to state and local governments; it is kept by the tribe who recently allocated some $3 million from that fund to buy property in Solvang.

Similarly, the per capita profit distributions to each of the 152 tribal members amounts to about a half-million dollars a year to each tribal member. The state income taxes on that amount of money would be almost $9 million a year that the state does not get.

The amount of money that trickles down into the local economy from the salaries of employees and the costs of goods and services is nowhere near enough to make up for lost tax revenues or to pay the tribe’s fair share of the costs to the community for increased demands on public services and infrastructure. Neither are the occasional gifts tribes like the Chumash make usually to the police or fire agencies which gifts are often less than the $2 million the tribe still receives in federal welfare and grant monies every year.

The 59 Grey Davis compacts had a provision requiring the signatory tribes make a good-faith effort to comply with the California Environmental Quality Act [CEQA]. That provision provided that if tribal compliance was unsatisfactory then the Governor could demand a renegotiation of that provision. Tribal compliance was woefully inadequate, so in March 2003 Gov. Davis sent all the tribes a timely notice of required renegotiation. Not long after that, Gov. Davis was recalled for his inept leadership and Gov. Schwarzenegger was elected to replace him. During that campaign, Gov. Schwarzenegger assured the public he would make the casino tribes pay their fair share of the costs of providing public services and infrastructure to them at public expense, describing these casinos as “ripping the State off.” He also stood on the steps of the Capital, waving a broom and assuring the public he was going to sweep the corruption out of Sacramento. Once elected, he did neither.

In fact, he championed five expanded amendments a year or so later, creating compacts allowing those affected tribes to double and triple the number of slot machines and in doing so, making exaggerated claims as to how much money that would bring the state, it hasn’t come close to the amount claimed. In fact a recent court case in the 9th Circuit has held these tribes don’t have to pay any more money, going back to original giveaway compacts Gray Davis negotiated to pay back the tribes for his election and these five tribes can keep the extra slot machines and the revenue from them.

Shortly after Davis was recalled and just before his term was to end prematurely, he withdrew the notice to tribes demanding a renegotiation of the environmental protection clause in the compacts apparently out of pure spite because the public had ousted him from office and leaving environmental protection for all of the casino communities up to the “good-faith efforts” of the casino tribes in their neighborhood.

So despite the initial bluster and pontificating, Schwarzenegger did nothing to improve the false economics of Indian casinos. Most impartial studies, that is those that are not bought and paid for by Indian casinos, indicate that once the construction phase of a casino is finished, that it costs the host community $3.50 for every dollar the casino brings in.

Another economic myth is that by calling the casino a “resort” it will somehow become a destination location for tourists. This myth is debunked by several studies showing the vast majority of gamblers come from a one- to two-hour drive or fewer than 50 miles and come to gamble only.

Therefore, an Indian casino essentially siphons dollars from the immediate surroundings. Those are dollars and local monies not spent in other non-Indian businesses and entertainment venues where such discretionary income would otherwise be spent. Non-Indian businesses nearby often cannot compete with an Indian business that pays no taxes, is exempt from state and local laws, rules and regulations workers compensation and public liability insurance and cannot be sued for any of its misdeeds, no matter how outrageous they may be.

There are also the intangible and subtle negative impacts which are hard to place a monetary value upon. For example gambling addiction, substance abuse, family neglect, financial problems, bankruptcy and foreclosures, increased crimes of theft and embezzlement even increased suicides. Generally, chronic gamblers and addicts are not willing to stand up and admit they have gambled away food and rent money on the foolish belief they might win something in an unregulated, unpoliced and uninspected Indian casino, making monetary assessment of these negative impacts difficult to calculate.

Lastly, how can one measure the negative impacts of the corruption gambling dollars has brought to government and the impossibility of measuring in dollars the loss of integrity and honesty in state and local governments.

So widespread is this corruption I have written a concluding piece for next week’s Valley Journal.

It is more than clear at this point that Indian casinos are a false economy that creates far more detrimental and negative impacts on every community, and those costs and negative impacts are not offset by the creation of a few largely low-paying, unprotected and transient jobs in Indian casinos and businesses, nor by the purchases of goods and services. Nor do they come close to offsetting the millions in lost tax revenues needed to pay for all the public services and infrastructure used regularly by these casino tribes and their businesses.

NEXT TIME: THE CORRUPTION OF CALIFORNIA’S GOVERNMENT BY INDIAN GAMBLING DOLLARS AND THE LACK OF ANY EFFECTIVE POLICING AND SUPERVISION OVER ALL INDIAN GAMBLING CASINOS.

Guest Series on Tribal Gaming (Part 4)

Today’s entry in our ongoing series by Jim Marino on the development of tribal gaming in California deals with the immediate aftermath of the passage of Proposition 1A–the ballot measure that was a de facto legalization of tribal casino gambling in California.  For Hawaiians, this is an interesting study in how special interests can lobby and maneuver their way to their ends, regardless of popular sentiment on the issue.  Not to point any fingers or anything, but my experience in Hawaii politics doesn’t fill me with confidence that our own state’s politicians would be immune to the kind of machinations that were so successful in bringing gaming to California.  Also of interest, a short discussion of the impact of tribal sovereign immunity (which protects Indian tribes from certain lawsuits) and the societal impact of casinos.

INDIAN CASINO GAMBLING IN CALIFORNIA
AFTER PASSAGE OF PROPOSITION 1A
Santa Ynez Valley Journal
By Jim Marino, Guest Columnist
May 6, 2010

(Part 4)

As I discussed in last week’s article, Proposition 5 was struck down as unconstitutional by the California Supreme Court in August 1999. Undaunted by that fact, two months later in October 1999, Gov. Davis and the Legislature approved the 59 tribal-state compacts Davis negotiated in secret and without proper public input.

Then, to overcome the fact that these 59 compacts had been executed and approved by the Legislature without lawful authority, Gov. Davis and the Legislature put a second “Legislative Initiative” on the ballot in March 2000 called Proposition 1A. Although that Proposition was written as a Constitutional amendment to authorize the Governor to negotiate future compacts with Indian tribes with casinos in California, it was, in effect, intended to ratify the 59 illegally signed compacts approved 5 or 6 months earlier – and to do so without informing the voters, who approved Proposition 1A, of the real purposes of that initiative.

Just as soon as Proposition 1A was approved by voters in March 2000, the 59 compacts were submitted en masse to the Secretary of the Interior, who approved all of them without checking either the legitimacy of the tribes who signed them or the eligibility for gambling on the land that was identified as the sites for these 59 or more casinos.

As a result, several faux tribes who did not and still do not have eligible lands for any class II or class III gambling, as defined by the IGRA 25 USC section 2703 and 2719, were given class III gambling casino compacts by Gov. Davis.

As set out in an earlier installment, one of the most glaring problems created by the I.G.R.A. was its failure to provide for local input and control over gambling casinos that were thrust into their midst by the I.G.R.A. and by these tribal-state compacts.

Many of these 59 tribes, then armed with the Gray Davis “give-away” tribal-state compacts, began constructing casinos and acquiring lands to construct large mega-casinos. In some cases, they undertook to expand their existing gambling casinos far beyond the small and modest casino operations that existed in communities on existing Indian lands, and that were pointed to by the casino tribes during the campaigns for Proposition 5, and then later Proposition 1A as evidence of their need to continue these modest enterprises.

It became immediately apparent what a mistake it was to have approved Proposition 1A. The worthless compacts negotiated by Gov. Davis paid nothing to the state. These Indian casinos and businesses began placing tremendous demands on public services and infrastructure, yet they were immune from the taxes that pay for those things. Therefore, the non-Indian taxpayer had to shoulder that cost and received nothing from the casino profits and still don’t.

The provisions in these compacts requiring that the tribes would either participate in the State’s Workers Compensation system or establish an equivalent system, complete with impartial independent tribunals to protect their employees, was immediately ignored. These compacting tribes, neither participated in the State system nor adopted a comparable system, leaving injured employees with no effective recourse at all. The State and the various state agencies like the Attorney General and the Gambling Control Commission made no effort at all to force the casino tribes to abide by any compact terms, particularly those terms that were actually enforceable at law. The compacts have a provision 11, which allowed the State to sue a tribe to terminate the gambling compact for a violation of its terms but this has never been done. Injured citizens, workers or communities could not sue upon these compacts because the only rights to sue in these compacts for enforcement of the terms that were set out therein were limited to disputes between the State and the affected tribe. Again local governments, communities and non-Indian citizens had no say so. The term and condition, contained in these 59 virtually identical compacts, requiring protections for injured, damaged or cheated customers was likewise ignored by these casino tribes. Instead when customers sought relief for injuries or other tort damages, violations of law or breaches of contract, the tribes uniformly denied such claims and informed customers they could not sue the tribe, its casino or any other tribal business because of the court-created legal immunity doctrine (discussed in earlier segments of this series).

When anyone did sue them, the tribes would successfully move the court to dismiss the lawsuits and all claims, on the basis the tribe was immune from lawsuit. If injured employees or customers tried to sue the State or others as some did, based on the tribal-state compact provisions that were included, ostensibly for their protection, the State and tribes claimed the compacts created no “third-party rights” i.e., no rights for anyone but the State or the affected tribe. In one case, three injured employees I represented sued the State and the Governor instead of the Chumash tribe and casino, asserting the complete failure of the State to enforce the compact provisions, which were included to protect them. The State’s attorneys then removed the case from State court to federal court, asserting the case raised a “federal question” even though Worker’s Compensation law is a matter of state law and was the subject of a term set out in the compa ct.

Once removed to federal court, the State’s Attorney General then asserted that the Indian tribes were necessary or indispensable parties to the action, and moved the federal court to dismiss the case on the basis the Indian tribe or tribes, who were necessary or “indispensable parties,” could not be joined in any case because they were immune from lawsuit. Plaintiffs would have to join the tribe as a party, so this Catch-22 argument went, and the plaintiffs could not do so because the tribe and its businesses had immunity from all lawsuits. The case was thus dismissed and affirmed by a three-judge panel of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals. The U.S. Supreme Court refused to grant a writ of certiorari to hear the case.

People who dealt with or entered into contracts with these casino tribes and businesses found out that if the tribe stiffed them for the bill, they could not sue, again based on the court-created doctrine of legal immunity for Indian tribes and their businesses discussed in last week’s article.

This use of the tribal legal immunity doctrine to evade legal responsibility is one of the most flagrant and outrageous impacts of Indian gambling and business expansion. This doctrine is exacerbated by the fact that these tribes, their casinos and businesses, can also operate outside of all state and local laws (except alcohol-control law). Laws that were enacted over many years to protect customers, workers, the environment and quality of life.

They are able to evade these laws under the silly fiction that these tiny bands or tribes of fractional Indian descendants (some with only one or two members) are “sovereign governmental entities” of their own with governmental status, all just because bureaucrats at the Bureau of Indian Affairs have “recognized” or officially “acknowledged” them as a tribe, band or community of Indians.

As discussed earlier, before conferring the right to unregulated casino gambling on these “Indians,” neither the State of California nor the federal government made any effort to determine if the tribes who were given gambling compacts were legitimate tribes or whether the land on which they constructed casinos, or were seeking to do so, were legitimate and were located on legally eligible “Indian Lands” as defined under federal law [25 USC 2703 or 2719]. To this day, more than half of the 59 tribal-state compacts and Indian casinos operating in California, were and are probably still, operating illegally.

One of the common methods that gambling promoters and investors, using an “Indian tribe” as a front to introduce gambling casinos into a community, is the promise of “jobs.” Often they target communities that are economically depressed because they know local government, unions, Chambers of Commerce, businesses and others often jump at the chance for anything that creates “jobs.”

This Indian gambling casino explosion was so sudden and extensive, that a few years ago a developer ran a full-page ad in the Palm Springs newspaper advertising that he had investors willing to bankroll “Indian casinos” and tribal recognition and listing a toll-free number. At the request of Arizona Sen. John McCain, David Crosby, testifying as a witness, put that advertisement in the Congressional record during a hearing of an Indian Affairs Sub-Committee being held 4 years ago, specifically to review Indian gambling policies on local communities.

Sen. McCain promised those of us attending that hearing, several times over, that the IGRA had to be amended in order to provide for more local control over Indian gambling casinos. Despite those hollow promises, nothing has been done yet, years later. As evidenced by that ad, the stampede to turn California into another gambling Mecca like Nevada got so bad that promoters and gambling investors were literally trolling for “tribes.”

Because most local governments, elected officials and their attorneys knew virtually nothing about Indian Law, gambling law or the false economics of gambling casinos, they did not know how to deal with the flood of Indian casinos the State had improperly authorized. They were easily convinced by tribes and investors that locating an Indian casino in their community was a “done deal,” and they had nothing to say about it because it was all a matter of federal law and furthermore, it would be good for the community economy anyway. The casino tribe might even agree to pay them something in lieu of the many taxes they don’t pay if they cooperated, but if the local government didn’t play ball and support the casino proposal, they would get nothing.

As a result of all this subtle blackmail, gambling promoters and investors, along with ersatz Indian tribes have been able to locate casinos in numerous communities even though they are not wanted, produce no benefit and only create a host of problems as well as place untold demands and costs on all government and public services and all infra-structure without paying the taxes needed to fund them.

In talking with many people who voted in favor of Proposition 1A, every single person I spoke with expressed the fact that they believed they were voting at the time, to allow the existing Indian tribes in California to simply retain the low-key gambling operations they had at the time and solely on their own lands. No one expressed to me any understanding that a vote in favor of that Proposition 1A was authority for dozens of tiny Indian tribes made up of fractional or questionable Indian descendants to be able to build huge Las Vegas style mega-casinos anywhere they wanted to. In fact, the many people I spoke with indicated they also expected any Indian gambling casino to remain on their existing Indian lands.

What has in fact occurred is that those existing tiny and modest casinos have been replaced with glitzy giant casinos measured in hundreds of thousands of square feet and thousands of gambling devices.

There are casinos that have ruined entire residential neighborhoods like the San Manuel Casino rising above single-family homes in a housing tract, which homes then lost most of their value because of the nearby gambling operations. Neighbors complained about noise, traffic, drunkenness, open drug trafficking and even having to pick up beer cans and used hypodermic needles from their front lawns.

Virtually every casino community has now experienced increases in crime ranging from shoot-outs, murder, theft, robbery, embezzlement, gang activity, substance abuse and drug trafficking, drunk driving, auto accidents and fatalities, gambling addictions, credit problems and bankruptcies, family neglect, even suicides, and the list goes on. Recently, Highway 154 ominously being called “the Chumash Highway” has experienced several auto accident fatalities, not to mention the officially unexplained suicide jumpers from the Cold Springs Canyon bridge. Only a few weeks ago, a gang shoot-out erupted amongst the slot machines at the Jackson Rancheria casino located in Amador County.

Not long ago, Sheriffs deputies were involved in a running gun battle outside the Soboba Casino where at least two suspects, who were tribal members, were shot and killed and the Sheriff refused to respond to calls there anymore. One deputy Sheriff working a special overtime detail at the Chumash Casino in Santa Ynez arrested 36 drug violators in only six weeks time, most of them felonies involving methamphetamines being used, possessed and sold around the casino.

In another case, an elderly couple were walking in the parking lot of another Southern California Indian casino near San Bernardino and a thief whizzed by on a motorcycle and snatched the woman’s purse in the parking lot. The motorcycle grazed their car during the theft. They reported the incident to casino security guards, expecting that the crime would be reported to the Sheriff’s Department. They found out later, when they made an insurance claim for the damage to their car, this incident was never reported to the police. This is but another of the many negative impacts of Indian casinos, the fact that the primary duty of Indian casino security staff is to conceal any negative incidents that occur or insinuate the false claim that some kind of “sovereign status” permits them to deal with criminal acts when it does not.

Another problem is the failure and refusal of many local media outlets to report the crime, corruption and negative incidents occurring regularly at Indian casinos because those casinos are the biggest television, radio and newspaper advertisers they have. So the so-called “free press” has in effect, been co-opted by the fear of offending these gambling casinos who are their best advertising customers.

The increased demands on public service and infrastructure created by Indian gambling casinos are immeasurable and are detrimental to the surrounding areas near these unregulated casinos, which have been or are being located in, or near, highly populated areas.

NEXT TIME (PART 5): THE FALSE ECONOMICS OF INDIAN GAMBLING CASINOS AND ITS CORRUPTION OF THE STATE’S GOVERNMENT

This article was originally published in the Santa Ynez Valley Journal.

Guest Series on Tribal Gaming (Part 3)

Today, we continue with the third part of our guest series on the development of Indian casino gaming in California, by Jim Marino.  (This series originally ran in the Santa Ynez Valley Journal.)

Sometimes it seems as though the issue of gaming is an unspoken controversy that advocates of the Akaka Bill are desperately trying to avoid.  As though the fact that it is not allowed under the current version of the bill is a sufficient guarantee forevermore.  But, as today’s installment demonstrates, a state can move from no casino gaming of any kind to a flood of Indian casinos in a surprisingly short time–and with little to no real input from the public.  Those who are concerned about Akaka being the path to Hawaiian casino culture would do well to take note of California’s experience. . .

RESULTS OF I.G.R.A AND THE PASSAGE OF PROPOSITION 1A AND THE FLOOD OF INDIAN GAMBLING CASINOS IN CALIFORNIA
Santa Ynez Valley Journal
By Jim Marino, Guest Columnist
April 29, 2010

(Part 3)

The first week I discussed what led up to the enactment of the IGRA. Last week I wrote about all of the antiquated, ambiguous and contradictory aspects of federal Indian law and policy in existence, when the ill-advised Indian Gaming and Regulatory Act [IGRA] was enacted by Congress, in a feeble attempt to provide an economy for Indian tribes.

As you may recall from last week, the controversial Indian gambling law was enacted by Congress without even considering the impact the existing body of federal Indian law and policy would have. This resulted in the authorization of tax free, lawless and unregulated casino gambling by Indian tribes and related businesses in which patrons, workers and the nearby communities are, in effect, deprived of all their legal and Constitutional rights and cannot sue for injuries or damages occurring in those casinos and businesses. I also wrote of how that Act has also enabled these tiny often questionable tribes to make hundreds of millions in profits, while still collecting federal welfare and grant monies that are monies needed by real Indians still living on remote reservations and living in conditions of abject poverty.

This week’s article deals with how Indian gambling was legalized in California and some of the impacts of the IGRA and the Indian casinos it spawned in California, has had on nearby non-Indian communities.

To give Congress the benefit of the doubt, Congress created the only method that States had available to them in order to control and regulate Indian casino gambling under the IGRA. That mechanism was the requirement that prior to engaging in Class III gambling casinos the tribe and state government would have to enter into a compact (or contract). They did this by including section 2710 d.(3) in Title 25. Under that provision, Indian tribes seeking to engage in class III casino gambling were required to negotiate and have the affected state approve, a compact. If the state lawfully approved a compact, then it was lawfully in effect according to State law.

Following the enactment of the IGRA in 1988 many bands of Indians in California, some with only one or two members, began operating class II Bingo games with unlimited money pay-offs. The Santa Ynez Chumash built a cinderblock building as a “Bingo casino” funded at least in part by the Las Vegas singer Wayne Newton and other Las Vegas gambling investors and apparently did so under questionable circumstances. It soon closed down amongst rumors and controversy, but with a view toward reopening in the future.

Class II “Bingo” gaming under the IGRA does not require a tribal-state compact, only a license from the National Indian Gaming Commission [NIGC] and is in effect unsupervised gaming beyond licensing and annual audits. Before the Supreme Court struck down the provision in the IGRA, giving the tribes the right to sue the state when they claimed the State was not negotiating in good faith, California tribes threatened the State with several suits if the State did not negotiate compacts for full-scale Class III casino gambling. The California Constitution Art. 4, Section 19, prohibited full-scale casino gambling including slot machines, blackjack, craps, roulette and so forth.

Because slot machines generally make up 85 percent of the revenue any casino brings in, the tribes were threatening lawsuit if the State would not negotiate for slot machines and banked card games like blackjack. (Remember the Cabazon case discussion earlier. The State had the absolute right to refuse to allow all forms of gambling by any Indian tribe, as long as those types of games were also prohibited for everyone else in the state to operate.) Slot machines had been illegal in California for years and use, possession or transport was a violation of the California Penal Code.

One lawsuit brought by Indian tribes in the 1990s claimed the lotto terminals the State had licensed to bars and cocktail lounges all over the state were, in effect, state run “slot machines.” Therefore, the tribes claimed they had a right to install slot machines in their casinos. The court denied that assertion but was highly critical of the definition of “slot machines” set out in the California Penal Code. As a result, the state pulled all these machines from bars all over the state and stored them in a warehouse, where I believe they still sit today.

Many tribes like the Santa Ynez Chumash simply ignored the law prohibiting slot machines and the requirement of a tribal-state compact in 25 USC 2710 d (3) requiring such a compact before Class III gambling could be allowed. Then one night in 1995, the Chumash moved more than 600 slot machines into the cinderblock former Bingo casino and began illegally offering slot machines to the public and position player backed blackjack games. The installation of these slot machines also constituted a violation of the Johnson Act, a federal law prohibiting the unlawful transportation, use, procurement and possession of slot machines. After all, the delaying litigation was exhausted in 1997. The State Attorney General and federal authorities including the F.B.I. informed the illegal casino tribes like the Santa Ynez Chumash that they intended to raid them, seize the slot machines, all monies and other illegal fruits of the illegal gambling operations and even arrest the operators. The tribes then launched a public initiative-drive entitled Proposition 5 in 1998.

Proposition 5 was an initiative to amend the California Government Code to allow Indian tribes to operate slot machines on Indian lands in California. Besides sponsoring that initiative the tribes, many of whom were operating illegal casinos with slot machines at the time, like the Santa Ynez Chumash, pumped millions of dollars into an advertising campaign to depict pictures of poverty-stricken Indian tribes self-sufficient.

In addition to this advertising campaign, these casino Indians pumped millions into the campaign coffers of Grey Davis, a career politician who was running for Governor in 1998. In November 1998, Proposition 5 was approved by the voters and Grey Davis was elected Governor. Commencing in 1999, Gov. Davis began negotiating gambling compacts with California Indian tribes, all of which was done behind closed doors. None of the traditional power groups in California such as local governments, taxpayers groups, law enforcement organizations, environmental groups, trial lawyers, workers compensation and consumer lawyer groups, women’s rights groups, union and others were allowed the opportunity to participate in the discussions and influence the terms of these tribal-state class III gambling compacts.

As a result, the compacts Gov. Davis agreed to were weak, giveaway compacts with many provisions so poorly written that they were virtually unenforceable. These compacts provided no revenue at all to the state and made no provisions to mitigate the significant negative impacts the flood of Indian casinos that resulted would have, and subsequently did have, on local communities.

In the meantime, Proposition 5 was challenged in a lawsuit and in August 1999 the California Supreme Court ruled that Proposition 5 was unconstitutional because it only amended the Government Code not the State Constitution, which contained the prohibition on casino gambling like slot machines and house banked card games in Art. 4, sec. 19.

Undaunted by the Supreme Court’s striking down Proposition 5, Gov. Davis executed some 59 of these giveaway tribal state compacts and then had the State Legislature approve them in September and October 1998. He made no effort to determine if the tribes he was negotiating with, and granted gambling compacts to, were lawfully created Indian tribes or if the land on which their casinos or proposed casinos were to be sited were legally “Indian Lands” eligible class for III gambling under federal law. In fact, many of these questionable Indian tribes were on land or acquired land that was clearly not eligible to build and operate any class II or class III gambling casinos under the IGRA.

To remedy the fact that these compacts were executed and approved when there was no longer any legal authority to do so, the Legislature put a “Legislative initiative” on the ballot for March 2000 the following year at Gov. Davis’ behest, some 6 months after they were executed and approved. That initiative, called Proposition 1A, by its language proposed to amend the California State Constitution Art. 4, sec. 19, to authorize the Governor to negotiate future compacts with California Indian tribes. The voters were never informed that a vote in favor of Proposition 1A would, in effect, retroactively ratify the 59-weak giveaway, virtually unenforceable compacts that Gov. Davis has already signed without legal authority and which were approved at his instance by the State’s Legislature. It is not coincidence that so many State legislators also received hundreds of thousands of dollars in campaign contributions from these casino tribes, often funneled throu gh campaign committees and PAC’s with unassuming names. My favorite was the one calling itself “The California Native Peace Officers Association.” That PAC was funded by $5,000,000 million entirely from the Pechanga Indian Casino and the State Correctional Officers Union and was distributed to key politicians in Sacramento. The use of PACs is one of the ways politicians use to disguise receipt of gambling monies by disguising them through innocent-sounding groups. Once legalized in 2000 by Proposition 1A, the onslaught of Indian casinos in California began.

NEXT TIME: PART 4, THE EXPANSION OF “INDIAN CASINO GAMBLING IN CALIFORNIA AFTER PASSAGE OF PROPOSITION 1A AND THE NEGATIVE IMPACTS ON LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND COMMUNITIES.”

Guest Series on Tribal Gaming (Part 2)

Today, we are continuing our guest series on the history of Indian gaming in California by Jim Marino.  Today’s excerpt (originally published in the Santa Ynez Valley Journal)  looks more specifically at how we arrived at the legal definition of “Indian”–at least as far as the federal government and Indian gaming regulation is concerned.  As accustomed as we generally are to the notion of an intrusive and exacting federal bureaucracy, it is shocking to learn exactly how loosely this term is interpreted.   Other items of note in today’s excerpt is the way that land is defined (or acquired) as “tribal land” for the purposes of casino construction and the liability loopholes that Indian casinos are able to operate under.

THE INDIAN GAMING AND REGULATORY
ACT OF 1988: A WELL INTENDED LAW GONE AWRY
Santa Ynez Valley Journal
By
Jim Marino, Guest Columnist
April 22, 2010

(Part 2)

Last week I wrote about the history of Indian gambling and the 1987 landmark case of Cabazon Tribe v. California leading up to the hasty enactment of the IGRA.

The first mistake Congress made in trying to clarify for the states the impact of the Supreme Court in the Cabazon case was in the name of the Act itself. To me, games are checkers, chess, basketball, etc. The gambling industry came up with the name change, calling gambling games “Gaming.” They apparently hoped to shed the inherent stigma associated with gambling activities and transform gambling into what they classify as recreational entertainment.

If it were really a “game” then the visitors, who nearly always lose, would have the worst record of anyone competing in any “game” against the home team. Not only the fact that the odds of winning anything are so poor, it is hard to imagine that anyone could describe losing large amounts of money as “entertainment.” What Congress failed to realize, or perhaps intentionally ignored, was that when they enacted the IGRA, there was already in place a long and confusing set of laws, rules and case decisions loosely called “Indian Law.” Some of the obscure, often irrational and unintelligible provisions of this body of law would shock most reasonable people. The advent of Indian gambling, however, exposed this body of existing laws to widespread public scrutiny, particularly when the extent and application of these principals, are now being applied to the non-Indian public who frequent the expanding numbers of Indian casinos and other Indian businesses.

One would think the first simple question that Congress would have asked before enacting this controversial legislation is, “Who is an Indian?” More particularly before giving any Indian tribe the right to operate an essentially unregulated gambling casino, Congress would have also needed to understand “What is an Indian tribe?”

In the former case, an Indian is anyone who claims to be part Indian or who is a member of any self-styled “Indian tribe,” or in the eyes of the federal government, an Indian is whoever a recognized Indian tribe decides is an Indian. Once one of these often questionable tribes attains official acknowledgement status, the BIA never questions tribal government’s assertion or representations about who is a tribal member, who isn’t a member or who they decide to kick out as no longer members: a practice euphemistically described as “disenrollment.” Until relatively recently, there were not even any objective criteria to be applied by the BIA in making a determination to acknowledge or recognize who constitutes an “Indian tribe.” Ever since the adoption of at least some rules and objective criteria, as set out in 25 CFR part 83, those rules and criteria are, never the less, often ignored. So in a nutshell, an Indian tribe is whoever the federal government says is an Indian tribe.

That is why there are now more than 600 Indian tribes in this country, many with only a handful of members, some with only one or two and many with highly questionable, if any, fractional ancestry linking them to a real Indian. Since the advent of federal programs providing grant monies to “Indian tribes” and particularly since the advent of Indian gambling, there have been many more groups claiming to be Indians and seeking federal acknowledgment as a “tribe” or “band” of Indians.

In fact, Indian tribes like the so-called “Mashantucket Pequot Indians,” which started with “Skip” Hayward and a couple of relatives, parlayed a faux tribal recognition, into the billion-dollar-a-year “Foxwoods Casino” in Ledyard, Conn. They have set as an enrollment criteria, a 1/32nd Indian ancestry or blood quantum and it is no wonder that these tribal members literally came out of the woodwork and the tribal enrollment now exceeds 700. Having that minute a fraction of Indian ancestry, however, did not prevent them from owning and operating that billion-dollar-a-year gambling casino at Foxwoods, all done with the sanction of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the National Indian Gaming Commission, just because there are and were no objective standards applied.

So there is no surprise that hundreds heretofore never heard of “Indians” and “Indian tribes,” are lining up for recognition and the right to own and operate lucrative gambling casinos, and hiring lobbyists and paying off politicians to grease the wheels of recognition in Washington.

Lobbyists like the now disgraced and imprisoned Jack Abramoff, whose assistance was instrumental in obtaining recent recognition for the Mashpee Wampanoag is now seeking to build a casino on or near Cape Cod, Mass. This is a recent federally recognized Indian tribe, which was determined by a federal judge to lack the very criteria for recognition needed, in a case decided during the 1970s, when the tribe tried to take over acres of land around Mashpee, Mass., including the massive multi-million dollar New Seabury country club and resort development.

Not only did Congress fail to clarify what constitutes an “Indian tribe” and who is an Indian when they enacted the IGRA, they also failed to clearly define what lands are the “Indian Lands” required by that Act, and which are the lands a tribe is required to have before they can build, own and operate any gambling casino.

This failure has opened the door to real Indian tribes as well as highly questionable tribes alike, to buy or acquire fee land usually, with money furnished by non-Indian gambling investors, and then claim it is eligible “Indian Lands” on which they can build and operate a gambling casino and can do so wherever they believe there is a lucrative non-Indian gambling market to be had in the area. This has fostered a practice now called “reservation shopping!”

Not only did Congress enact the IGRA without addressing these important issues and weaknesses in federal Indian policy, regarding who is an Indian, what constitutes an Indian tribe and what constitutes “Indian Lands” that are eligible for gambling casinos, Congress failed to address another important legal doctrine. A legal anomaly created by various federal court decisions giving Indian tribes, their officers, agents, casinos and other businesses, total immunity from lawsuit no matter how outrageous their conduct may be.

On top of that, with a few exceptions, Indian tribes and their businesses operate without complying with almost all state and local laws enacted for the protection of all customers, consumers, workers and the nearby communities based on the legal and political fiction they are somehow a sovereign political governmental entity. These numerous laws were enacted by virtually every state to protect workers and customers, the environment and quality of life for adjacent communities everywhere. However, they do not apply to Indian casinos and businesses. Finally, Indian tribes can evade all of the many state and local taxes, which are clearly needed to fund all the infrastructure and public services that these Indian tribes and their casinos and businesses uses regularly at the rest of the non-Indian taxpayer expense.

This common law [court-made] legal immunity doctrine barring injured and damaged persons from suing an Indian tribe, its casinos and business was described in 1998 U.S. Supreme Court case as having been created, “almost by accident” by the earlier Turner case decided in 1921 and was described by the Court as a legal anachronism in need of elimination. In that case, [Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma versus Manufacturing Technologies, Inc.] after concluding this doctrine should be eliminated in this day and age where the Indian tribes own and operate lucrative gambling casinos, hotels, restaurants, amusement parks, marinas, shopping centers and other businesses – all open to the public and employing non-Indians – a majority of the court nevertheless concluded that it was up to Congress to fix legal anomaly created by a succession of cases decided by liberal federal judges in court decisions decided over the past 70 years.

Even though that Kiowa case was decided 12 years ago in 1998, and despite the fact the court informed Congress could simply amend the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, which federal law provides that any foreign country or business operating in the United States must obey all the same laws, pay all the same taxes and can be sued just like everyone else can be for their misconduct.

Because Congress has not acted, then to this day, customers who patronize any Indian casino or business, or anyone who works in an Indian casino and business, have no legal or Constitutional rights. In other words, they patronize these casinos and businesses at their own risk. As one Florida judge said, while reluctantly dismissing a woman’s valid lawsuit for injuries caused by an Indian tribe in their casino, “The law should require a large sign at the entrance to all Indian casinos and businesses warning people that are entering at their own risk.” When one thinks of the hundreds of state and local laws defining and regulating many things necessary for the public welfare and safety, one has to wonder what Congress was thinking, or perhaps not thinking, by passing a federal law allowing Indian tribes to own and operate gambling casinos and a wide variety of businesses that are not subject to state and local laws, are not taxable for all public services and infrastructure they use regularly and are immune from lawsuits by anyone who has been damaged or injured by misconduct of the tribe, its agents and employees or businesses.

Lastly when Congress enacted the IGRA, allowing some tiny federally acknowledged “Indian tribes” to make tens of millions in profits from gambling losses, they did nothing to amend the many existing laws that provide millions of dollars in tax monies via grants and welfare funds set aside for Indians in general. Consequently, these fractional “Indian” descendants and often questionable “tribes” making hundreds of millions of dollars in casino profits, still get millions in federal grant monies and welfare aid while thousands of real Native American Indians still live on remote reservations in conditions of abject poverty and get nothing more that the pittance they live on.

Clearly enacted by Congress with good intentions, but it is a law done badly awry.

NEXT TIME: “THE RESULTS OF THE I.G.R.A. THE PASSAGE OF PROPOSTITION 1A AND THE FLOOD OF INDIAN GAMBLING IN CALIFORNIA.”


Guest Series on Tribal Gaming (Part 1)

A big part of the debate over the Akaka Bill has revolved around exactly what rights and privileges will belong to the new Native Hawaiian “tribe” following reorganization, and with the issue of casino gaming and gambling long holding a contentious place in Hawaiian politics, it was inevitable that the proposed bill would have to address the issue .  Some believe that the prohibition on gaming in the Akaka Bill is sufficient to put the matter to rest, while others (including this blog) have pointed out that the language of the bill may not be the final word on the matter–especially with so much money at stake.

Under the circumstances, I thought it would be interesting to look at the history of the development of Indian gaming in another context (namely, California), and am therefore happy to introduce the first part in a series of guest columns by Jim Marino, an attorney from Santa Barbara who is an expert on the issue.  These columns were originally published earlier this year  in the Santa Ynez Valley Journal, and manage the rare feat of being both interesting and educational.  Enjoy:

HISTORY AND IMPACTS OF INDIAN GAMING IN CALIFORNIA
Santa Ynez Valley Journal
By Jim Marino, Guest Columnist
April 15, 2010

(Part 1)

It has been almost 10 years exactly since Indian casino gambling was legalized in California. Very few people know the history of Indian gambling casinos in California so this is a good time to review that history. I will do this is a five-part series covering the origin of Indian gambling in California up to the present time.

As public attitudes loosened toward gambling in general, many states began to expand legalized gambling. Betting on horse racing at race tracks had long been permitted. The only limitation was the use “bookies” or other off-track intermediaries to place bets, collect and pay off bets made on horses. Many cities also had a thriving underground “lottery” system usually called the “numbers rackets.”

People picked numbers and made a bet, the numbers were then selected often by using the winning numbers of horses running in certain races at a particular race track. Similarly, though probably illegal, Saturday night “penny ante” poker games were commonplace everywhere, and in some communities people engaged in shooting “craps” – a form of gambling using dice. Although many of these gambling activities were illegal, law enforcement placed very low priority on raiding illegal off-track bookie operations, or the “poor man’s lottery,” the numbers rackets, or Saturday evening poker games played for money usually occurring between friends and for relatively small amounts of money.

Then there were the full-on legal casino gambling venues which were limited to Nevada, Atlantic City, New Jersey and cruise lines and riverboats, where the full range of gambling games were allowed. These included slot machines, roulette, craps, blackjack and other house-banked card games pitting the gamblers playing those games against the house and not each other.

As attitudes toward gambling changed and more and more people saw these many forms of gambling as harmless, state and local governments took a second look at their laws strictly prohibiting most gambling games. Soon many states had state-run lotteries and allowed poker rooms or card clubs and even legalized off-track betting on horse races. Taking it a step further, many states allowed charitable groups to hold Bingo games for money, but licensed them and limited the amounts of money one could play and win and the hours and conditions of operation.

Meanwhile, the federal government had been trying for decades to find a way for the real historic Indian tribes to become self-sufficient and sustainable and doing so without eliminating the Indian tribal reservation system, which for decades had blocked the integration of Indians into mainstream America, particularly the mainstream of American economy.

Many tribes and particularly tribal governments resisted any change or attempts at assimilation, which they considered a threat to their tribe’s cultural preservation and a threat to the fiction that Indian tribes and their governments were “sovereign nations” notwithstanding the nearly total dependency of most tribes on the federal government.

Many of the 600 or so recognized tribes had only a handful of members and little land base. As Tim Giago, a noted Lakota Sioux writer, once wrote in an editorial, “Indians don’t need more welfare, they need a welfare to work program.”

Congress passed many laws in the struggle to improve a lot of reservation Indians and eliminate the massive bureaucracy that had been established, called the Bureau of Indian Affairs (B.I.A.), and its even bigger parent, the Department of Interior (D.O.I.).

Congress was loathe to eliminate the inherent separation and isolation created by the tribal reservation system. In most cases these federal laws and programs were ineffective. The real historic tribes of Indians often saw those assimilation efforts as an attempt to extinguish their respective cultures or impinge on what they considered to be a “sovereign status.”

Beginning during the late 1970s and early 1980s, Indian tribes in Florida and other states began offering Bingo for money as a tribal business and method of earning money.

Not long after those efforts began the tiny Cabazon Indian tribe located near Palm Springs asserted the right to offer Bingo games for money, and without any limitation on the amounts of money, conditions and hours of operation that applied to groups under California charitable Bingo laws. They also wanted to open a card club like those being operated under State and local licensing, but without the regulations imposed by the California Gambling Control Board and local jurisdictions. California refused to allow these Bingo games and card clubs, because the State feared it could not control such activities when it was occurring on Indian reservation lands.

A lawsuit entitled Cabazon Tribe v. California (Governor Wilson) was commenced and finally wound its way through the system and wound up before the United States Supreme Court in 1987. In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court divided California gambling games into two groups: Those games that were illegal and prohibited by everyone, everywhere in the state and those that were permitted like charitable Bingo, horse racing and card clubs. The court concluded that Indian tribes in California were entitled to operate Bingo, card games and other forms of gambling that were permitted to other non-Indians within the state.

They further concluded that because Indian tribes had historically been accorded a measure of self-government and control of their governmental affairs on their reservation lands, then when operating these permitted games they could regulate these games on their own – setting the rules and limits of play for themselves and need not follow California’s limitations.

On the other hand, the Court made it clear all gambling games that were prohibited to everyone within the State of California as a matter of strong public policy were likewise prohibited on any Indian reservations within the borders of California.

This was a fairly straightforward decision; however, it was poorly understood by many state and local governments all over the country, many of which thought this decision would open the floodgates of gambling in their respective states.

Consequently Congress moved quickly in what they thought would clarify the Cabazon case, and in October 1988 they enacted the Indian Gaming and Regulatory Act [the IGRA] 25 USC 2701 et.seq.

This Act divided Indian Gambling games into three groups: Class I was any traditional Indian games played amongst tribal members. Class II was Bingo or similar traditional games played on a card by marking a number of letters as they were randomly selected and called out or posted. These games were licensed and regulated by the National Indian Gaming Commission also created by the I.G.R.A. Class III gaming was the full-on casino style gambling like slot machines, “craps,” roulette, blackjack and other “house-banked” games where the players are playing against the house and not against each other. To be entitled to engage in Class III gambling games, the Indian tribe must have a tribal-state compact approved by the state and lawfully in effect under state law. As it later turned out, this federal law created more problems than it resolved.

Next time: The Indian Gaming and Regulatory Act, an example of a well-intended law gone awry.

Account(in)ability

Imagine for a moment that you had a few thousand dollars in loose change and bills behind the cushions of your couch, in your old jacket pockets, a spare wallet or two, and spread out through a few pairs of pants.  How big a jerk would you be in this situation if you then went to your best friend, told him you were totally broke, and asked to him to give you money to pay your rent?  If you answered, “No more a jerk than your average local politician,” you win.  Congratulations!  You truly understand the nature of Hawaii politics.

According to a recent report from the Grassroot Institute of Hawaii, the state has more that $1.4 billion in unspent excess funds sitting in “special funds” accounts–several of which have long been noted by the state auditor for repeal.  What is a “special fund”?  In short, it’s a little niche set-aside of state money for some specific purpose–say, public art education–funded through anything from state license fees to legislative appropriations.  You may recall that the 2009 Legislative Session included a finance bill that gave the Hawaii director finance authority to “raid” these special funds if necessary to pay government expenses.  This, not unnaturally, got some of us wondering exactly how much money there was available in these state special funds.  In light of the nearly relentless efforts to raise taxes and raid our wallets, the knowledge that there are untold millions of state dollars sitting around in untouched “special funds” is just a wee bit infuriating.

Thus, the Grassroot Institute launched its own investigation into the extent of Hawaii’s “special funds”.  You can read the full report here, but some highlights include:

  • In a review of 20 State Department reports, they found 186 accounts identified as special funds.
  • This accounts amounted to a combined excess balance of $1,412,357,203.
  • Divided equally among the population of Hawaii, these combined excess balances have a refund value of $1090.47.
  • The Hawaii Department of Transportation was the worst offender, with $582,449,161 reported as unspent, while the Hawaii Health Systems Corporation had the smallest excess at $34,837.

Really, how outrageous is the situation when the smallest, most responsible excess is still more money that many Hawaiians make in a year?  An economist once pointed out that there are four ways to spend money: 1. You can spend your own money on yourself, in which case you look for the best possible value in quality and price; 2. You spend other people’s money on yourself, in which case you look for the best quality and damn the price; or 3. You spend your money on other people, and look for the best value in terms of price and might compromise on value; and 4. You spend other people’s money on other people, and to heck with quality, value, price, or anything other than getting home from work a little earlier than usual.  Most government spending–especially as practiced in Hawaii–falls into Category 4.  We get nothing but sob stories from every possible state representative about lack of revenue.  We get tax increases and “Furlough Fridays” and guilt trips about the plight of government workers.  And all this time, they’ve been hoarding funds to the tune of $1.4 billion.  It boggles the mind.

That’s “Entertainment”?

So, how often do you like to kick back and watch a little Pacific Network Internet television?  Yeah, me neither.

But would you make more of an effort if you knew that they were getting nearly a million dollars from OHA for the creation of a “Hawaiian-themed internet television station and web portal”?  It kinda makes you wonder what a cool million buys these days in the way of internet entertainment . . . aside from buckets of Farmville cash or enough “adult videos” to end up under permanent FBI surveillance, of course.

Curious as to what a Hawaiian internet TV station might look like, I checked out their website, and was confronted by . . . Puppies!  Adorable ones! In a shopping cart!  Also, canoeing wipe-outs and some footage of a party in Waikiki that didn’t seem interesting enough to click on.  In all honesty, it looked more like a creation of the Hawaii Tourism Authority than anything intended for Hawaii residents, much less Native Hawaiians.  And if this were a private enterprise, that would be no big deal.  I mean, I would question their business plan, but we live in a country where people are entitled to waste their own money in whatever way they wish.  And I would no more stop someone from starting a questionable business enterprise than from going to an Rob Schneider movie.  (Ok, that’s not entirely true.  I would probably at least try to urge them, out of basic human decency, to avoid the movie.)  But this is beside the point.  Because we’re not talking about private enterprise here.  We’re talking about money intended for the benefit of the Native Hawaiian people.  And we’re talking about a quasi-governmental agency that hopes to have a big hand in the proposed Native Hawaiian Reorganization proposed by the Akaka Bill.

The crazy thing is that we have seen plenty of media enterprises aimed at speaking primarily to one minority group succeed (BET and Telemundo come to mind, but there are others too).  But they succeed or fail in the marketplace by learning to speak to their audience and growing their audience in a profitable way.  Who is the Pacific Network speaking to?  The lack of advertising on the website suggests that profitability at this point is determined only by the success of their grant proposals.  If you were (or are) Native Hawaiian, would you consider this an effective way of reaching out or fostering the Native Hawaiian community?  Or is it just another OHA vanity grant that looks good on paper, but disappoints in reality?

More on the Akaka Petition

It’s always dumbfounding to me how the pro-Akaka Bill crowd is always trying to place a clumsy thumb on the scale of public opinion.  If you didn’t know where to look, you’d think that Hawaii was largely in favor of the bill (rather than sharply divided over it).  Moreover, you’d be convinced that every single Native Hawaiian in the state was clamoring for its passage.  That’s certainly how it must look sometimes to the Washington beltway crowd.  (Who, let’s face it, have a long history of swinging back and forth between romanticizing the Aloha state and then totally disregarding it.)  The good news (and I do have some) is that there are groups out there (including groups of Native Hawaiians) who are opposed to the Akaka Bill and are working to let Washington know that there are more voices out here than those of the vote-counting politicians and OHA.  Not long ago, I posted a link to an online petition demanding public hearings on the Akaka Bill in Hawaii.  Well here, in its entirety, is the letter sent from Leon Siu (head of the Keoni Foundation, a coalition of Native Hawaiian groups) to every U.S. Senator, citing that very petition in a request that Senators vote against the Bill.  Enjoy:

HAWAIIANS DEMAND AKAKA BILL HEARINGS IN HAWAI`I
Petition Shows Broad Anti-Akaka Bill Sentiment

Aloha,

We are contacting you to make you aware of broad opposition to S.1011, the Native Hawaiian Government Reorganization Act of 2009, otherwise known as the Akaka bill, throughout Hawai`i and to ask for your vote AGAINST this bill.

Regardless of what Hawai`i Senators Akaka and Inouye have told your office, the people of Hawai`i, including Native Hawaiians, do not support the Akaka bill and are demanding public hearings be held in Hawai`i before any vote occurs in Congress.

Over the years, poll after poll has shown the citizens of Hawai`i, both native and non-native to be overwhelmingly opposed to this bill.

Moreover an online anti-Akaka bill petition has garnered hundreds of signers from all political points of view, both of natives and non-natives.

A copy, with over eight hundred signatures is attached to this email. The petition can also be seen online at http://StopAkakaPetition.com <http://StopAkakaPetition.com>

“We, the people of Hawai`i, declare our opposition to the 2010 version of the Akaka bill, and strongly object to being excluded from this legislative process,” stated Leon Siu representing the Koani Foundation, part of a coalition of Native Hawaiian groups.

“We have long been told that open, public debates in matters that affect the citizenry are part of the US democratic process. But it has not been so with the Akaka bill.”

“We, the people of Hawai`i, insist the US Senate Indian Affairs Committee hold public hearings on S.1011 in Hawai`i as soon as possible. We demand to be heard.”

The only time public hearings were held in Hawai`i on the bill was ten years ago.

At that hearing, people turned out in record numbers to oppose the legislation.

Since then, the only hearings held on the Akaka bill were in Washington, DC in the dead of winter, 5,000 miles from Hawai`i, and no opposing testimony from Hawaiians or anyone else was allowed.

For more information, contact Leon Siu at (808) 488-4669.

Death and . . . well, you know

So, who do you think pays the most in state taxes in the US?  New Yorkers?  That would have been my guess, simply based on how legendarily expensive it is.  (Not to mention how bad a beating my wallet takes every time I go there.  Ok, technically speaking, the nice restaurants shouldn’t count as a New York tax–it’s really more of a tax on me for not living in NYC.)  So then, if not New York, maybe Massachusetts?  Don’t they call it “The People’s Republic of Massachusetts”?  If a strong tradition of Northeastern liberalism doesn’t result in a hefty tax bill, then nothing will.

Yes, New York and Massachusetts both make the top 5.  But for a sheer, soul-crushing, burdensome tax scheme, no other state can beat Hawaii.  That’s right.  We’re #1! We’re #1!  I quote the San Francisco Chronicle’s recent article on the states with the greatest individual tax burden on their residents:

  • Hawaii
    The Aloha State may be renowned as one of the most beautiful states in the Union, but that beauty comes at significant cost: the average Hawaiian paid out $1,010 in state taxes in the first quarter of the year, the highest of any state. The two biggest components to the state’s revenues were income and excise taxes.

    Unlike many other states, Hawaii doesn’t have a sales tax – instead, Hawaiians pay gross receipts (or excise) taxes on each of their purchases. That means that items like rent, medical bills and food are all taxable purchases in Hawaii, unlike other states with traditional sales tax. That also means that tax-exempt non-profits have to pay out Hawaii’s excise tax regardless of their status in other states. (Real estate costs in Hawaii are also high. Read more, in Simple Ways To Save In Retirement.)

  • Read more:

    http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/g/a/2010/07/21/investopedia45833.DTL#ixzz0uuya68km

    How bad is it when San Francisco feels sorry for you?  Damn. (In case you’re wondering, rounding out the top 5 are Connecticut, New York, Minnesota, and Massachusetts.  A small, mean part of me feels that higher taxes are no less than those residents deserve for having the Patriots, Red Sox, Yankees, Giants, Jets, and Vikings between them.  Hawaii’s number one and doesn’t have so much as a professional soccer team to its credit.  How’s that fair? )
    So could you use an extra couple of thousand dollars a year?  (Double for couples where you both work.)  Because this is where our decades of high-tax/high-spend policies have landed us.  With an individual tax burden higher than any other state in the US.  Personally, I think it’s time we start asking our legislative and gubernatorial candidates some hard questions about their tax policies.